Who Gets Access? The Legal Stakes of Dutch Hydrogen Policy

The Dutch hydrogen decision note, on 17 June 2026, presents an integrated strategy linking production, infrastructure, demand and imports. Its deeper significance concerns how government intervention constitutes a market: who receives support, which infrastructure becomes viable, and whose participation remains possible. The note recommends ministerial action; it does not itself establish subsidy entitlements, binding industrial obligations or emissions exemptions (Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei [KGG], 2026). Distinguishing policy intention from operative law is therefore essential.

Demand creation illustrates this distinction. The note envisages an industrial annual obligation beginning in January 2028. The underlying European requirement is more specific than a general renewable hydrogen quota: Article 22a of Directive 2018/2001, inserted by RED III, requires renewable fuels of non-biological origin to represent specified shares of industrial hydrogen consumption, subject to calculation exclusions. The headline figures are 42% by 2030 and 60% by 2035; Article 22b provides conditional flexibility (Directive 2023/2413, 2023). National implementation must translate these state-level requirements into clear, enforceable duties for regulated firms.

Infrastructure finance raises a distributive question. The note explores an amortisation model and possible government guarantees. Article 5(3) of Regulation 2024/1789 expressly permits network costs to be recovered over time, provided the regulatory authority approves the methodology; associated guarantees must comply with Article 107 TFEU (Regulation 2024/1789, 2024). Spreading costs may support early investment, but projected profitability cannot establish legal compliance or equitable allocation. Regulators must scrutinise which users bear deferred costs and how demand shortfalls affect the proposed financing arrangement.

Picture: Author. Hydrogen Valley days, May 2026, Antwerpen.

These choices connect directly to my research on corporate gatekeeping and the spatial constitution of hydrogen markets. My Netherlands–Finland comparison examines how planning, economic allocations and corporate contracts interact to shape practical access (Hoseini, 2026). A network-access entitlement cannot by itself supply an industrial site, an offtake contract or a timely connection. Article 35 permits negotiated network access during a transitional period ending in 2032, subject to safeguards (Directive 2024/1788, 2024). The empirical question is whether early coordination enables entry or creates durable advantages that later regulation cannot adequately correct.

Environmental flexibility demands equal precision. The note proposes facilitating tailored nitrogen-oxide requirements when existing fossil-fuel installations convert to hydrogen (KGG, 2026). That proposal is no evidence that applicable emissions or nature-protection requirements can lawfully be displaced. Where Article 6 of the Aarhus Convention applies, participation must occur early enough for options to remain open (Aarhus Convention, 1998). Whether prior land agreements or infrastructure commitments undermine that opportunity requires examination of actual decisions and retained alternatives.

Picture: Author. With Tatiana Block (NEC), Hydrogen Valley days, May 2026, Antwerpen.

For adaptive regulation, tracing each policy promise into its implementing instrument, responsible institution, allocation criteria and available remedy, would make comercialisation of projects more transparent and assist reaching FIDs. Review clauses should specify evidence, revision triggers and who may demand reconsideration as the brilliant team of Clean Hydrogen Partnership are working on it. Comparing successful, rejected and withdrawn entry pathways could reveal where coordination becomes exclusion (Wait until the signatories of IF25 be announced later this year). The Dutch note supplies an agenda for investigation, rather than proof of unlawful gatekeeping. The decisive issue is enforceable institutional accountability. Hydrogen policy becomes institutionally credible when investment support is accompanied by transparent admission rules and effective opportunities to challenge exclusion.

References:

Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161 U.N.T.S. 447. [Official text](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:22005A0517(01)).

Directive (EU) 2023/2413 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive (EU) 2018/2001 as regards the promotion of energy from renewable sources. (2023). *Official Journal of the European Union, L*, 2023/2413. [Official text](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2023/2413/oj/eng).

Directive (EU) 2024/1788 of the European Parliament and of the Council on common rules for the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen (recast). (2024). *Official Journal of the European Union, L*, 2024/1788. [Official text](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2024/1788/oj/eng).

Ministerie van Klimaat en Groene Groei. (2026, June 17). *Beslisnota voortgang waterstofbeleid* (KGG_DGKE/107019215), pp. 1–2.

Regulation (EU) 2024/1789 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the internal markets for renewable gas, natural gas and hydrogen (recast). (2024). *Official Journal of the European Union, L*, 2024/1789. [Official text](https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1789/oj/eng).